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MUNICIPAL ZONING AND LAND USE REGULATION*
Chester James Antieau;: *
Z ONING refers to the districting of municipalities on the basis
of one or both of (a) nature and extent of use, and
(b) architectural and structural requirements. Today the power
to zone is regularly possessed by municipal corporations, either
directly under state constitutions" or by legislative grant.2  The
general principle of municipal zoning is clearly constitutional. 3
A municipal zoning ordinance wil be sustained so long as it
is reasonable and bears a reasonable relationship to the com-
munity health, safety, morality, or general welfare.4  According
to the present majority view such a relationship is not satisfied
by an ordinance posited solely upon aesthetic considerations.5
There is, however, some authority that aesthetic considerations
will alone justify zoning," and if the reasonable relationship to
the public health, safety, morality, or general welfare otherwise
* One of a series of articles examining the present status of the law of
municipal corporations. Others appear in current issues of the Temple Law
Quarterly, Missouri Law Review, Washington University Law Quarterly, and
Rocky Mountain Law Review.
* Professor of law, Detroit College of Law.
I Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); Building Comm'r
of Medford v. C. & H. Co., 319 Mass. 273, 65 N.E.2d 537 (1946) ; In re Ceresini,
8 Harr. 134, 189 At. 443 (Del. Super. Ct. 1936).
2 FLA. STATS. ANN. § 176.01 et seq.; KAN. GEN. STATS. § 12-707 (1935);
Mici. STrs. ANN. § 5.2932 (1947 Cum. Supp.). Courts had denied an inherent
municipal power to zone. Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207, 177 N.W. 722
(1920).
3 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4 Stafford v. Coffeyville, 161 Kan. 311, 168 P.2d 91 (1946); Fass v. High-
land Park, 321 Mich. 156, 32 N.W.2d 375 (1948) ; Notes, 19 A.L.R. 1395 (1922),
33 A.L.R. 287 (1924), 38 A.L.R. 1496 (1925), 43 A.L.R. 668 (1926), 54 A.L.R. 1030
(1928), 86 A.L.R. 659 (1933), 117 A.L.R. 1117 (1938).
5 Youngstown v. Kahan Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842
(1925); Frischkorn Construction Co. v. Lambert, 315 Mich. 556, 24 N.W.2d 209
(1946); State ex rel. Srigley v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713
(1929); Dowsey v. Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931); Women's
Kansas City St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1932);
Wolverine Sign Co. v. Bloomfield Hills, 279 Mich. 205, 271 N.W. 823 (1937).
a Ware v. Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923); Thompson v. Carrol-
ton, 211 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland
Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 S.2d 364 (1941), 40 MICH. L. Rav. 606 (1942). See also
West Bros. Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881, app. dism. 302
U.S. 658 (1937), 24 VA. LAw Rav. 581 (1938); State ex rel. Carter v. Harper,
182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1925); State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans,
154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923).
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exists, the presence of aesthetic considerations will never invalidate
an ordinance. 7
Zoning ordinances have been held unreasonable and invalid
when (a) based upon racial considerations;" (b) retroactive in their
application;9 (c) the description and location of the several zones
was indefinite; 10 (d) the boundaries of the districts were drawn
carelessly or unfairly;": (e) the zoning action did not follow a
comprehensive plan; 12 (f) there was an unjustified lack of uni-
formity throughout an area homogenically constituted;" (g) a
generally legal activity was banned from everywhere in the munici-
pality;' 4 (h) a particular activity was banned from a zone while
others not reasonably differentiated from it were permitted;" (i)
there was a lack of standards or guidance for those charged with
7 "An aesthetic purpose needs but little help from a practical one to
withstand an attack on constitutional grounds." People v. Sterling, 128 Misc.
650, 220 N.Y. Supp. 315, 318 (1927);, Generally, see Baker Aesthetic Zoning
Regulations, 25 MicH. L. Rav. 124 (1926); Baker, Municipal Aesthetics and
the Law, 20 ILL. L. REv. 456 (1926); Light, Aesthetics in Zoning, 14 MINN. L.
REv. 109 (1930).
s Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
9 Comment, 39 YALE L.J. 735 (1930); Noel, Retroactive Zoning and
Nuisances, 41 COL. L. Rav. 457 (1941). See also cases cited in note 51.
10 Moon v. Smith, 138 Fla. 410, 189 So. 835 (1939); Taylor v. Moore, 303
Pa. 469, 154 Atl. 799 (1931). It is eminently desirable to attach a copy of the
zoning map to the ordinance and make it an essential part thereof. Speroni v.
Board of Appeals of City of Sterling, 368 111. 568, 15 N.E.2d 302 (1938).
13 Ehrlich v. Wilmette, 361 Ill. 213, 197 N.E. 567 (1935); People ex rel.
Deitenbeck v. Oak Park, 331 Ill. 406, 163 N.E. 445 (1928); Nectow v. Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), 3 U. OF CIN. L. Rv. 319 (1929), 7 Tax. L. Rav.
157 (1929); Cordts v. Hutton Co., 146 Misc. 10, 262 N.Y. Supp. 539, aff'd, 241
App. Div. 648, 269 N.Y. Supp. 936, affd 266 N.Y. 399, 195 N.E. 124 (1934);
State ex rel. Tingley v. Gurda, 209 Wis. 63, 243 N.W. 317 (1932); Mehl v.
Stenger, 38 Ohio App. 416, 175 N.E. 712 (1930). Compare Pleasant Ridge v.
Cooper, 267 Mich. 603, 255 N.W. 371 (1934), with Heckman v. Independence,
127 Kan. 658, 274 Pac. 723 (1929). Unreasonableness of the lines may often
be proved by showing the particular property is surrounded by property of
another classification. Taylor v. Glencoe, 372 Ill. 507, 25 N.E.2d 62 (1939);
Jersey Triangle Corp. v. Board of Adj. of Jersey City, 127 N.J.L. 194, 21 A.2d
845 (1941).
12 Davis v. Omaha, 45 N.W.2d 172 (Nebr. 1950); Women's Kansas City St.
Andrew Society v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1932).
'. City of Olean v. Conkling, 157 Misc. 63, 283 N.Y.S. 66 (1935); Scholl v.
Borough of Yeadon, 26 A.2d 135 (Pa. 1942). See also Clements v. McCabe,
210 Mich. 207, 177 N.W. 722 (1920); Blankenship v. Richmond, 188 Va. 97,
49 S.E.2d 321 (1948).
'4 Gulf Oil v. Board of Comm'rs, 128 N.J.L. 376, 26 A.2d 246 (1942).
'5 James S. Holden Co. v. Conner, 257 Mich. 580, 241 N.W. 915 (1932);
Page v. Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280 (1946); Hedgcock v. People ex rel.
Reed, 91 Colo. 155, 13 P.2d 264 (1932); Continental Oil v. Twin Falls, 49 Idaho 89,
286 Pac. 353 (1930); Village of University Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphan's
Home, 20 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1927), 54 A.L.R. 1006 (1928).
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the administration of the ordinance;16 (j) the beneficial use of
property was permanently so restricted that it could not con-
sistently with the ordinance be used for any reasonable purpose;1
(k) limitation upon the use of property greatly diminished its
value with only a distant relationship to public health, safety,
morality or general welfare; 8 and (1) when changed conditions
made an originally valid zoning ordinance later unreasonable in
its limitations upon property use.19
Equal protection of the laws is not denied by exempting from
the terms of a zoning ordinance prior nonconforming uses.2 0  By
the weight of authority zoning restrictions and building regulations
cannot be imposed upon one's property by his neighbors under
delegation from a municipal legislative body.21 On the other
hand, a zoning ordinance is frequently sustained notwithstanding
it permits the lifting of imposed restrictions upon securing the
16 State ex rel. Srigley v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713
(1929); Selligman v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 277 Ky. 551, 126 S.W.2d
419 (1938); Taylor v. Moore, 303 Pa. 469, 154 At. 799 (1931); Pentecostal
Holiness Church v. Dunn, 248 Ala. 314, 27 S.W.2d 561 (1946); Weicker Trans-
fer & Storage Co. v. Denver, 75 Colo. 475, 226 Pac. 857 (1924).
'7 Eaton v. Sweeny, 257 N.Y. 176, 177 N.E. 412 (1931); State ex rel. Taylor
v. Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 1241, 133 So. 114 (1931); City of North Muskegon v.
Miller, 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929); Arverne Bay Construction Co. v.
Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587, 117 A.L.R. 1110 (1938); Dowsey v.
Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427, 86 A.L.R. 642 (1931); City of Pitts-
field v. Oleksak, 313 Mass. 553, 47 N.E.2d 930 (1943); Forde v. Miami Beach,
146 Fla. 676, 1 S.2d 642 (1941); Northwest Mechants Terminal v. O'Rourke,
60 A.2d 743 (Md. Ct. App. 1948); Sundlun v. Board of Rev., 50 R.I. 108,
145 At. 451 (1929). Notes, 86 A.L.R. 671 (1933), 117 A.L.R. 1117, 1129 (1938).
is People ex rel. Lind v. Rockford, 354 Ill. 377, 188 N.E. 446 (1933);
State Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilmette, 358 Ill. 311, 193 N.E. 131 (1934); Taylor
v. Village of Glencoe, 372 Ill. 507, 25 N.E.2d 62 (1939); Reschke v. Winnetka,
362 Ill. 478, 2 N.E.2d 718 (1936); Senefsky v. Huntington Woods, 307 Mich.
728, 12 N.W.2d 387, 149 A.L.R. 1433 (1943); Village of LaGrange v. Leitch,
377 I1. 99, 35 N.E.2d 346 (1941); Strain v. Mims, 123 Conn. 275, 193 Atl. 754
(1937); Vine v. Zabriskie, 122 N.J.L. 4, 3 A.2d 886 (1939); City of West
University Place v. Ellis, 134 Tex. 222, 134 S.W.2d 1038 (1920); Forbes
v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 180 N.E. 767 (1932); People v. Chicago, 402
111. 321, 83 N.E.2d 592 (1949); Long v. Highland Park, 45 N.W.2d 10 (Mich.
1950). Notes, 86 A.L.R. 670 (1933), 117 A.L.R. 1117, 1128 (1938).
19 Skalko v. Sunnyvale, 14 Cal.2d 213, 93 P.2d 93 (1939), 38 MICH. L. Rav. 434
(1940); Forde v. Miami Beach, 146 Fla. 676, 1 S.2d 642 (1941).
20 City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1926) ; City of Norton
v. Hutson, 142 Kan. 305, 46 P.2d 630 (1935); Magruder v. Redwood City, 203
Cal. 665, 265 Pac. 806 (1928). Note, 86 A.L.R. 659, 678 (1933).
21 Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). Havighurst, Property Owners'
Consent Provisions in Zoning Ordinances, 36 W. VA. L.Q. 175 (1930). Note,
119 A.L.R. 1462 (1939).
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consent of nearby property owners. 22  Ordinances should be
drawn so as to require council action after consents have been
filed and this is dearly constitutional.23
Frequently courts have said that a zoning ordinance comes
to the judiciary with a presumption of validity,24 although the
judicial record somewhat belies such a recognition.2, It should
also be noted that municipal zoning ordinances will be invalid
when in conflict with state law, 6 and occasionally it is even held
that zoning ordinances as applied to interstate carriers constitute
an undue burden on interstate commerce. 27
Municipalities have been sustained in excluding from des-
ignated districts zoned for residential use not only commercial and
industrial establishments, 28 but also buildings (a) on undersize
lots; 29 (b) set too close to front sidewalks;30 (c) with inadequate
622 City of East Lansing v. Smith, 277 Mich. 495, 269 N.W. 573 (1936);
Downey v. Sioux City, 208 Iowa 1273, 227 N.W. 125 (1929); Cusack v.
Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); but see Washington ex rel. Seattle Title &
Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928). Jaffe, Law Maling by Private
Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201, 226-8 (1937).
23 City of Stockton v. Frisbie & Latta, 93 Cal. App. 277, 270 Pac. 270
(1928), 27 MICH. L. Ray. 472 (1929); Building Inspector of Lowell v. Stoklosa,
250 Mass. 52, 145 N.E. 262 (1924).
24 American Wood Products Co. v. Minneapolis, 35 F.2d 657 (8th Cir.
1929); Bond v. Cooke, 237 App. Div. 229, 262 N.Y. Supp. 199 (1932); Corpor-
ation of Presiding Bishop v. Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949);
City of Pittsfield v. Oleksak, 313 Mass. 553, _47 N.E.2d 930 (1943); Zadworny
v. Chicago, 380 Ill. 470, 44 N.E.2d 426 (1942); Otis v. Los Angeles, 52 Cal.
A.2d 605, 126 P.2d 954 (1942); Miami v. Rosen, 151 Fla. 677, 10 S.2d 307
(1942); Jacobson v. Wilmette, 403 Ill. 250, 85 N.E.2d 753 (1949); City of
Omaha v. Glissman, 151 Neb. 895, 39 N.W.2d 828 (1949); Fass v. Highland
Park, 320 Mich. 182, 30 N.W.2d 828 (1948). Notes, 86 A.L.R. 665 (1933), 117
A.L.R. 1117 (1938).
25 Hitchman v. Oakland Twp., 45 N.W.2d 306 (Mich. 1951). See also
cases cited in notes 8 through 19.
20 Thorofare Developing Corp. v. Deegan, 134 Misc. 592 (1929), 235 N.Y.
Supp. 544t aff'd, 226 App. Div. 871, 235 N.Y. Supp. 898 (1929); Bennett v.
Board of Appeals of Cambridge, 268 Mass. 419, 167 N.E. 659 (1929); State
ex rel. Nigro v. Kansas City, 325 Mo. 95, 27 S.W.2d 1030 (1930); Long Island
Lighting Co. v. Old Brookville, 72 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1947), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 569,
81 N.E.2d 104 (1948).
27 Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Milltown, 93 F. Supp. 287
(D.N.J. 1950).
28 State v. Houghton, 142 Minn. 28, 170 N.W. 853 (1919); Anderson v.
Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354 (1928). Notes, 86 A.L.R. 659 (1933), 117
A.L.R. 1117 (1938).
29 Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942); Dundee Realty
Co. v. Omaha, 144 Neb. 448, 13 N.W.2d 634 (1944); Clemons v. Los Angeles,
216 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1950); Appeal of Elkins Park Imp. Ass'n, 361 Pa. 322, 64
A.2d 783 (1949); Dilliard v. North Hills, 276 App. Div. 969, 94 N.Y.S.2d 715
(1950). Contra: Hitchman v. Oakland Twp., 45 N.W.2d 306 (Mich. 1951)(requirement of three acres per parcel). Cf. Bjork v. Safford, 333 Ill. 355, 164
N. E. 699 (1928), and Collins v. Board of Adjustment, 3 N.J. 200, 69 A.2d 708
(1949). Notes, 64 HARV. L. REv. 326 (1951), 50 COL. L. REv. 202, 215 (1950).
4
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yard space; 3 ' (d) with less than a minimum floor space; 32 (e) with
excessive height;3 3 (f) or bulk; 34  (g) intended for apartments 35
or other multiple dwellings.36  Funeral homes frequently seek
locations in residential districts and the courts regularly sustain
their exclusion a7  So, too, gasoline stations s and commercial
10 Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Kerr's Appeal, 294 Pa. 246, 144
At. 81 (1928), 27 MicH. L. REv. 959 (1929); Moore v. City of Pratt, 148 Kan.
53, 79 P.2d 871 (1938). But see Mulleady v. Trenton, 156 At1. 843 (N.J.L. 1931),
30 MICH. L. REv. 803 (1932). Notes, 28 A.L.R. 314 (1924), 44 A.L.R. 1377
(1926), 53 A.L.R. 1222 (1928).
31 R.B. Construction Co. v. Jackson, 152 Md. 671, 137 Atl. 278 (1927);
Doherty v. Town Council of South Kingston, 61 R.I. 248, 200 Atl. 964 (1938);
Junge's Appeal, 89 Pa. Super. 548 (1926); Howell v. Cooper, 33 Ohio App.
287, 168 N.E. 757 (1929); Lewis v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 7 N.J. Misc. 27, 143 Atl.
865 (1928); Appeal of Blackstone, 38 Del. 230, 190 Atl. 597 (1937); Appeal of
Elkins Park Imp. Ass'n, 361 Pa. 322, 64 A.2d 783 (1949); Wynn v. Margate
City, 8 N.J. Misc. 1324, 157 Atl. 565 (1931). Notes, 27 A.L.R. 443 (1923), 9
A.L.R. 1040 (1920), 59 A.L.R. 518 (1929), 141 A.L.R. 693 (1942).
32 Thompson v. Carrolton, 211 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). Contra:
Senefsky v. Huntington Woods, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.V.2d 387, 149 A.L.R. 1433
(1943); Baker v. Somerville, 138 Neb. 466, 293 N.W. 326 (1940); Lionshead
Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Twp., 8 N.J. Super. 468, 73 A.2d 287 (1950). See McCrory,
The Undersized House: a Municipal Problem, 27 CHi-KENT L. Ray. 142 (1948).
.' Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 79 N.E. 745 (1907), affd, 214 U.S.
91 (1909); Taber v. Benton Harbor, 280 Mich. 522, 274 N.W. 324 (1937);
Brougher v. Board of Public Works, etc., 107 Cal. App. 15, 290 Pac. 140
(1930); Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); Van Duyne v.
Senior, 105 N.J.L. 257, 143 Atl. 437 (1928); Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220, 70
At. 113 (1908); Harris v. State, 23 Ohio App. 33, 155 N.E. 166 (1926).
Compare 122 Main Street Corp. v. Brockton, 323 Mass. 646, 84 N.E.2d 13
(1949) (invalidating a minimum height requirement for buildings in a business
district).
.14 Harris v. State, 23 Ohio App. 33, 155 N.E. 166 (1926). Minimum cost
requirements are apt to be held unconstitutional. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne
Twp., 8 N.J. Super. 468, 73 A.2d 287 (1950). Note, 50 CoL. L. REv. 200, 205
(1950).
35 Leigh v. Wichita, 148 Kan. 53, 79 P.2d 871 (1938); State ex rel. Morris
v. East Cleveland, 31 Ohio Dec. 197, 22 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 549 (C.P. 1920);
Rice v. Van Vranken, 132 Misc. 82, 229 N.Y. Supp. 32 (1928); Wilcox v.
Pittsburgh, 121 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1941), 8 U. OF Pirr. L. REV. 69 (1941), 30
GEo. L.J. 97 (1941); Koch v. Toledo, 37 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1930); Fox Meadow
Estates v. Culley, 233 App. Div. 250, 252 N.Y. Supp. 178 (1930).
:6 Bret v. Building Comm'r of Brookline, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269
(1924); Repp v. Schahadi, 132 N.J.L. 24, 38 A.2d 284 (1944); Jacobson v.
Wilmette, 403 Ill. 250, 85 N.E.2d 753 (1949). Note, 37 MICH. L. Raw. 992 (1939).
:97 Heimerle v. Bronxville, 168 Misc. 783, 5 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1938), aff'1d,
256 App. Div. 993, 11 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1939); Morrison v. Cleveland, 210 Ohio
Law Abs. 396 (Ohio App. 1936); Momeier v. McAlister, 203 S.C. 353, 27 S.E.2d
504 (1943); Lewis v. Baltimore, 164 Md. 146, 164 Atl. 220 (1933); Bond v.
Cooke, 237 App. Div. 229, 262 N.Y. Supp. 199 (1932). Note, 43 A.L.R. 1160
(1926).
38 City of Jackson v. McPherson, 162 Miss. 164, 138 So. 604 (1932) ; Leary
v. Adams, 226 Ala. 472, 147 So. 391 (1933); Heckman v. Independence, 127
Kan. 658, 274 Pac. 732 (1929); Texas Co. v. Tampa, 100 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.
1938); Howden v. Savannah, 172 Ga. 833, 159 S.E. 401 (1933). Note Gulf Oil
v. Board of Comm'rs etc., 128 N.J.L. 376, 26 A.2d 246 (1942) (invalidating
Newark's attempt to ban gas stations from the entire city).
5
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parking lots.39 Municipalities have generally been unable to
exclude from residential zones private educational, 0 religious, 41
and charitable institutions.
42
Courts customarily permit in residential districts certain
"accessory uses" and there is constant litigation concerning the
scope of the term. Garages42 and servant quarters 4 are almost
always deemed to be within the concept. Courts are likely to
call the professional use of a residence by a medical practitioner
an accessory use,4 5 but when others employ houses in residential
zones for business purposes courts are willing to enjoin the
activity.46 Use of a residence for a tourist home or boarding
39 Monument Garage Corp. v. Levy, 266 N.Y. 339, 194 N.E. 848 (1935);
Boardwalk Corp v. Murdock, 286 N.Y. 494, 36 N.E.2d 678 (1941). Note, 38
GEo L.J. 494 (1950).
40 Western Theological Seminary v. Evanston, 325 Ill. 511, 156 N.E. 778
(1927); R. C. Archbishop v. Baker, 140 Ore. 600, 15 P.2d 391 (1932);
Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Kingery, 371 Ill. 257, 20 N.E.2d 583 (1939); City
of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Lear, 128 Fla. 750, 175 So. 537 (1937). Contra:
Application of Devereaux Foundation, 351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744, app. dism.,
326 U.S. 686 (1945); State ex rel. Hacharedi v. Baxter, 148 Ohio St. 221, 74
N.E.2d 242, app. dism., 332 U.S. 827 (1947).
41 State ex. rel. Synod of Ohio v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515,
138 A.L.R. 1274 (1942); State ex rel. R. Cath. Bishop v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231, 90
P.2d 217 (1939); State ex rel. Westminister Presbyterian Church v. Edgecomb,
108 Neb. 859, 189 N.W. 617 (1922); State ex rel. Howell v. Meador, 109 W. Va.
368, 154 S.E. 876 (1930). Contra: Church of Latter Day Saints v. Porterville,
90 Cal. App. 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 805 (1950). Note,
138 A.L.R. 1011 (1942).
42 Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Society v. Kansas City, 58 F.2d 593
(8th Cir. 1932) (home for old people); Village of University Heights v. Cleve-
land Jewish Orphans' Home, 20 F.2d 745 (6th Cir. 1927), 54 A.L.R. 1008
(1928). Contra: Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1931)
(hospital for insane).
43 People v. Scrafano, 307 Mich. 655, 12 N.W.2d 325 (1944); Cochran v.
Preston, 108 Md. 220, 70 At. 113 (1908); Olson v. Zoning Board of Appeals
of Attleboro, 324 Mass. 57, 84 N.E.2d 544, 7 A.L.R.2d 591 (1949). Cf. Piper
v. Moore, 163 Kan. 565, 183 P.2d 965 (1947) (holding commercial garage re-
pairing not an accessory use).
44 Meador v. Nashville, 188 Tenn. 441, 220 S.W.2d 876 (1949). But see
Collins v. Board of Adj. of Margate, 3 N.J. Super. 553, 67 A.2d 332 (1949).
45 Notes, 117 A.L.R. 1117 (1938), 150 A.L.R. 494 (1944); and see cases
cited in following note.
46 Kort v. Los Angeles, 52 Cal. A.2d 804, 127 P,2d 66 (1942) (public
account); Connor v. University Park, 142 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)
(dentist); Ryan v. Warrenburg, 342 Mo. 761, 117 S.W.2d 303 (1938) (barber);
State ex rel. Kaegel v. Holekamp, 151 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. App. 1941) (dancing
school). But see People v. Kelly, 255 N.Y. 396, 175 N.E. 108 (1931) (permitting
teaching of music in residence).
6
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house is not generally considered an accessory use.47  A miscellany
of accessory uses can be gleaned from the reports.48
Districts zoned for multiple dwellings may similarly be kept
free from commercial and industrial uses, and commercial areas
may be protected against industrial encroachments.
4 9
Although a few courts have upheld zoning ordinances requir-
ing the termination of existing uses within a short time,50 the
overwhelming weight of present authority holds unconstitutional
an attempt to zone out prior uses.51 Somewhat similar in objective,
but far different in time allowed for termination, are the statutes
and ordinances requiring termination of use at the end of the
estimated useful life of the nonconforming structure.5 2  There is
good reason to believe that these very desirable attempts to end
the scourge of nonconforming uses will survive judicial scrutiny.5 3
Most zoning ordinances specifically sanction the continuance of
prior nonconforming uses and litigation continually exists re-
garding the actual use prior to the time of adoption of the
ordinance. 54  Contemplated use is never enough.5 5  Nor is the
47 Baddour v. Long Beach, 279 N.Y. 167, 18 N.E.2d 18 (1938), app. dism.,
308 U.S. 503 (1939), 37 MICH. L. REv. 992 (1939); Lincoln v. Logan-Jones, 120
Neb. 827, 235 N.V. 583 (1931). Cf. also Re Devereaux Foundation, 351 Pa.
478, 41 A.2d 744 (1945). Note, 50 COL. L. REv. 202, 216 ff. (1950). Note, 124
A.L.R. 1011 (1940).
-1 Village of St. Louis Park v. Casey, 218 Minn. 394, 16 N.W.2d 459, 155
A.L.R. 1128 (1944) (permitting short-wave antenna); Kenney v. Building
Comin'r, 315 Mass. 291, 52 N.E.2d 683, 150 A.L.R. 490 (1944) (permitting small
floral conservatory for pleasure of resident) ; City of New Orleans v. Estrade,
200 La. 552, 8 S.E.2d 536 (1942) (permitting lighted horseshoe pitching court.)
49 Note, 117 A.L.R. 1117 (1938).
51 State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613
(1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v.
Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929); Standard Oil v. Tallahassee, 183 F.2d
410 (5th Cir. 1950); State ex rel. Skilman v. Miami, 101 Fla. 585, 134 So.
541 (1931). Cf. Bazinsky v. Kesbec, 259 App. Div. 467, 19 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1940).
Note, 14 MINN. L. REv. 86 (1929).
51 Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich. 261, 222 NAV. 86 (1928);
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Garden City, 85 Misc. 508, 57 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1945);
Douglas v. Melrose Park, 389 Ill. 98, 58 N.E.2d 864 (1945); Acker v. Baldwin,
18 Cal.2d 341, 115 P.2d 455 (1941). Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances,
41 COL. L. RFv. 457 (1941); Comment, 39 YALE L.J. 735 (1930).
• E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. c. 24, § 73-1 (1945); Chicago Zoning Ordinance
§ 20 (1944); Wichita Zoning Ordinance § 24 (1948).
53 Comment, 35 VA. L. REv. 348 (1949); Note, 9 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 477
(1942).
54 Meserole v. Board of Adjustment, 172 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943);
Knox v. Mayor & Council of Baltimore,- 180 Md. 88, 23 A.2d 151 (1942); Park
v. Stolzheise, 24 Wash. 2d 781, 167 P.2d 412 (1946), 20 So. CALIF. L. REV. 30
(1947).
55 Chayt v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 177 Md. 426, 9 A.2d 747 (1939).
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mere possession of a building permit.50  So, too, when the possession
of the permit has been accompanied by the expenditure of but
a small sum. 57  However, the owner of property may acquire a
vested right if he secures a permit and in reliance thereon enters
into a construction contract and pays a sizeable sum5" or effectuates
a substantial and material change in his property by excavation
and construction. 5 It is not enough that a building was designed
for a nonconforming use if at the time of the passage of the
ordinance it was not actually utilized for a nonconforming use.00
Zoning ordinances may validly prevent the expansion of prior
nonconforming uses, 61 rebuilding or repair after destruction in
large part,6 2 structural alterations,"' substitution of another non-
56 Fox Lane Corp. v. Mann, 216 App. Div. 813, 215 N.Y. Supp. 334 (1926);
Ware v. Witchita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923); Spector v. Building In-
spector, 250 Mass. 63, 145 N.E. 265 (1924).
57 Lansing v. Dawley, 247 Mich. 394, 225 N.V. 500 (1929).
rs Doddins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904); Pelham View Apartments
v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 244 N.Y. Supp. 556 (1927).
51 Freeman v. Hague, 106 N.J.L. 137, 147 At. 553 (1929); Wickstorm v.
Laramie, 37 Wyo. 389, 262 Pac. 22 (1927); Rehman v. Des Moines, 200 Iowa
286, 204 N.W. 267, 40 A.L.R. 922 (1925); Daines v. Board of Public Works,
91 U.S. 580 (1875); Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich. 372, 228
N.V. 707 (1930); Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. A.2d
776, 194 l'.2d 148 (1948); Rosenberg v. Whitefish Bay, 199 Wis. 214, 225 N.W.
838 (1929). Compare, however: Selligman v. Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 277
Ky. 551, 126 S.W.2d 419 (1928); Bianchi v. Comm'r. 279 Mass. 136, 181 N.E.
120 (1932); Wood v. Building Comm'r, 256 Mass. 238, 152 N.E. 63 (1926);
Rollins v. Armstrong, 251 N.Y. 349, 167 N.E. 466 (1929); Colonial Beacon Oil
Co. v. Finn, 270 N.Y. 591, 1 N.E.2d 345 (1936); Ostrowsky v. Newark, 102 N.J.Eq.
169, 139 At. 911 (1928); Brett v. Building Comm'r, 250 Mass. 73, 145 N.E. 269
(1924).
60 Knickerbocker Ice v. Sprague, 4 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1933); Meserolc
v. Board of Adjustment, 172 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
61 Mercer Lumber Co. v. Glencoe, 390 Ill. 138, 60 N.E.2d 913, 23 Cm-K Ni'
L. REv. 349 (1945); Colati v. Jirout, 186 Md. 652, 47 A.2d 613 (1946); Austin
v. Older, 283 Mich. 667, 278 N.W. 727 (1938); McClandish v. Maumee, 70
Ohio Law Abs. 453 (Ohio App. 1929); Town of Marblehead v. Rosenthal, 316
Mass. 124, 55 N.E.2d 13 (1944); De Felice v. Zoning Board, 130 Conn. 156.
32 A.2d 635 (1943); Town of Lexington v. Bean, 272 Mass. 547, 172 N.E. 867
(1930).
02 Appeal of Berberian, 351 Pa. 475, 41 A.2d 670 (1945); Zalk & Joseph
Realty Co. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 60, 253 N.W. 8 (1934); State v.
Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 147 At. 294 (1929); Haase v. Memphis, 149 Tenn.
235, 259 S.W. 545 (1924); Jetter v. Hofheins, 190 Misc. 99, 70 N.Y.S.2d 808
(1947); Koeber v. Bedell, 254 App. Div. 584, 3 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1938): Comment,
35 MmIH. L. REv. 642 (1937). Notes, 26 A.L.R. 1219 (1923), 56 A.L.R.
878 (1928).
63 City of Earle v. Shackelford, 177 Ark. 291, 6 S.W.2d 294 (1928); Piccolo
v. West Haven, 120 Conn. 449, 181 Atl. 615 (1935); Commercial Club v. Chicago
R.R., 142 Minn. 169, 171 N.W. 312 (1919); State ex rel. Euclid-Doan Bldg,
Co. v. Cunningham, 97 Ohio St. 130, 119 N.E. 361 (1918); Selligman v. Von
Allmen Bros., 297 Ky. 121, 179 S.W.2d 207 (1944). Note, 64 A.L.R. 920 (1929).
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conforming use of equal or greater nonconformity,64 and resump-
tion if there has been an abandonment or discontinuance.
65
Zoning authorities have from time to time created "zones"
of single parcels of land, apparently to accommodate individual
supplicants, and the courts have regularly invalidated these abuses
of the zoning power.6 An occasional "spot" is sustained because
of a particularly localized health or safety problem. 67 A few
other cases have upheld individual parcel zoning when the court
found the general welfare of the community was advanced there-
by,6 and a few more cases sustain spot zoning on the theory that
the effect is nothing different from the grant of a variance permit
by an appeal board.6 9 Unfortunately, not only these but bona
fide attempts to cope with larger areas of a municipality, but
less than the whole, have often been labelled "piecemeal" or
"spot" zoning and the judicial antipathy to the former has per-
meated municipal attempts to zone on anything less than an all
614 Cole v. Battle Creek, 298 Mich. 98, 298 N.W. 466 (1941); State ex rel.
City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Stegner, 120 Ohio St. 418, 166 N.E. 226, 64 A.L.R. 916
(1929); Mercer Lumber Co. v. Village of Glencoe, 390 I1l. 138, 60 N.E.2d
913 (1945); Selligman v. Von Allmen Bros., 297 Ky. 121, 179 S.W.2d 207
(1944); Page v. City of Crosse Pointe, 279 Mich. 254, 271 N.W. 826 (1937);
Kensington Realty Corp. v. Jersey City, 118 N.J.L. 114, 191 At. 787 (1937);
Colati v. Jirout, 186 Md. 652, 47 A.2d 613 (1946); Town of Lexington v.
Bean, 272 Mass. 547, 172 N.E. 867 (1930); Beyer et al. v. Mayor & Council of
Baltimore, 34 A.2d 765 (Md. App. 1943). Prohibition of change to a less
offensive nonconforming use was invalidated in Palmer v. Detroit, 306 Mich.
449, 11 N.W.2d 199 (1943), 42 MICH. L. REv. 947 (1944). Notes, 64 A.L.R.
920 (1929), 117 A.L.R. 1117 (1938). Note, 28 Tax. L. REv. 125 (1949).
65 State ex rel. Turner v. Baumhauer, 234 Ala. 286, 174 So. 514 (1937);
Francisco v. City of Columbus, 33 Ohio 0. 404, 31 N.E.2d 236 (Ohio App.
1941), app. dism. 134 Ohio St. 526, 18 N.E.2d 404 (1938); Town of Darien
v. Webb, 115 Conn. 581, 162 Atl. 690 (1932). Abandonment must generally be
a voluntary act. Navin v. Early, 56 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1945). Comment, 35 VA.
L. REv. 348 (1949). Note, 41 COL. L. Rav. 457 (1941).
66 Smith v. Board of Appeals of Salem, 313 Mass. 622, 48 N.E.2d 620 (1943);
Huebner v. Philadelphia Savings Fund Society, 127 Pa. Super. 28, 192 Atl. 139
(1937); Whittemore v. Building Insp. of Falmouth, 313 Mass. 248, 46 N.E.2d
1016 (1943); Leahy v. Inspector of Bldgs. of New Bedford, 208 Mass. 128,
31 N.E.2d 436 (1941); Strain v. Minis, 123 Conn. 275, 193 Atl. 754 (1937);
Mueller v. Hoffmeister Undertaking & Livery Co., 343 Mo. 430, 121 S.W.2d
775 (1938); Linden M.E. Church v. Linden, 113 N.J.L. 188, 173 Atl. 593 (1934).
Note, 30 GEo. L.J. 97 (1941) contains further illustrations of spots invalidated.
Notes, 128 A.L.R. 740 (1940), 149 A.L.R. 292 (1944).
67 Nappi v. LaGuardia, 184 Misc. 755, 55 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1944), aff'd, 295
N.Y. 652, 64 N.E.2d 716 (1945); Bowen v. Hider, 37 N.Y.S.2d 76 (1942).
6s Higbee v. C.B. & Q.R.R., 235 Wis. 91, 292 N.W. 320, 128 A.L.R. 734
(1940); Edgewater Civic Club v. Blaisdell, 95 N.H. 244, 61 A.2d 517 (1948);
Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 104 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704 (1943); Ellicott v.
Mayor & Council of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A.2d 649 (1942).
6 Eggebeen v. Sonnenburg, 239 Wis. 213, 1 N.W.2d 84, 138 A.L.R. 495
(1941); Harris v. Piedmont, 5 Cal.A.2d 146, 42 P.2d 356 (1935).
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inclusive plan.7- There are, however, some cases sustaining area
zoning,". and it is suggested that the proper attitude is that of
the Maryland court that "there is no constitutional requirement
that an entire municipality or county be zoned at one time...
Amendment to present zoning statutes to authorize sectional zoning
seems desirable.7 3
On the same principles as the original zoning action7 4 a
municipality is empowered to amend a zoning ordinance when
the character and use of a district or surrounding territory have
become so changed since the original ordinance was enacted that
the public health, morals, safety and welfare would be promoted
if changes were made in the boundaries or in the regulations pre-
scribed for certain districts.75 Although there are no vested rights
in a zoning ordinance,76 courts are nevertheless keenly sympathetic
to persons who have purchased and improved property in reliance
upon a zoning ordinance,7 7 and a typical court suggests that
"amendments to zoning ordinances should be made with caution
and only when changing conditions clearly require amendment." 78
Amendments to zoning ordinances must be in harmony with the
-0 Page v. Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280 (1946); Spann v. Dallas,
111 Tex. 350, 212 S.W. 513; (1921); Johnson v. Huntsville, 249 Ala. 36, 2D
S.2d 342 (1947), 46 MICH. L. Rv. 110 (1947). Comment, 9 Tax L. REv. 50
(1930).
73 State ex rel. Henry v. Miami, 117 Fla. 594, 158 So. 82 (1934); Wilkins
v. San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 175 P.2d 542 (1945); State ex rel. Civello
v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); Town of Marblehead v.
Rosenthal, 316 Mass. 124, 55 N.E.2d 13 (1944). Notes, 128 A.L.R. 740 (1940),
149 A.L.R. 292 (1944).
72 County Comm'rs of Anne Arundel County v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, '16
A.2d 684, 688 (1946).
7. Notes, 46 MiC. L. Rav. 110 (1947), 30 GEo. L.J. 97 (1941).
74 Kuhlman v. Cincinnati, 5 Ohio Supp. 286, 18 0.0. 405, 32 O.L.A. 325
(C.P. 1940) ; Sandenburg v. Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich. 372, 228 N.W. 707
(1930); Kennedy v. Evansville, 348 Ill. 426, 181 N.E. 312 (1932).
'5 Leahy v. Inspector of Bldgs. of New Bedford, 308 Mass. 128, 31 N.E.2d
436 (1941); DePalma v. Town Plan Comm'n of Greenwich, 123 Conn. 257, 193
Ad. 868 (1937); Jardine v. Pasadena, 199 Cal. 64, 248 Pac. 225 (1926); Marble-
head Land Co. v. Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1931); Caires v, Building
Comm'r or Hingham, 323 Mass. 589, 83 N.E.2d 550 (1949); Cassel Realty Co.
v. Omaha, 144 Neb. 753, 14 N.W.2d 600 (1944).
76 Page v. Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280 (1946); Price v. Schwafel,
92 Cal.A.2d 77, 206 P.2d 683 (1949).
77 Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E.2d 993
(1939), 38 MIcH. L. R-v. 431 (1940); 2700 Irving Park Bldg. Corp. v. Chicago,
395 Ill. 138, 69 N.E.2d 827 (1946), 14 U. or CHI. L. REV. 718 (1947), 26
CHI-KENT L. Rav. 89 (1947); Murdock v. Norwood, 33 Ohio 0. 76, 67 N.E.2d
867 (1946); Phipps v. Chicago, 339 Ill. 315, 171 N.E. 289 (1930); Pelham View
Apartments v. Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 224 N.Y. Supp. 56 (1927); Kennedy v.
Evanston, 348 Ill. 426, 181 N.E. 312 (1932). Note, 138 A.L.R. 500 (1942).
78 Page v. Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280, 283 (1946) .
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general plan for the municipality79 and must not unduly depreciate
the value of surrounding properties.s0 Furthermore, they must
generally take cognizance of trends in urban development.s '
Decisions vary on whether municipalities can erect in zoned
districts nonconforming structures.3 2  There is some inclination
to utilize here the frequent distinction between governmental and
proprietary functions, permitting the construction of buildings
dedicated to governmental responsibilities notwithstanding non-
conformity to the zone.s3 Careful draftsmanship of zoning ordi-
nances can avoid problems such as this.8 4
Although a zoning ordinance authorizes a particular activity
in a district it may nevertheless be banned as a nuisance, because
of the nature of its operations8 5 And the orthodox view permits
residents of an area to exclude undesirable structures and uses
by restrictive covenants, even though the edifice or use may be
permitted in the district under applicable zoning ordinances.8 6
There is some thought that the expression of the public will
should be preferred to private agreements.8 7
AIRPORT APPROACH ZONING
Municipal corporations in at least thirty-six states possess
grants of power to zone airport approaches."8 Airport approach
79 Michigan-Lake Bldg. Corp. v. Hamilton, 340 Ill. 284, 172 N.E. 710
(1930); Kennedy v. Evanston, 348 Ill. 426, 181 N.E. 312 (1932); Linden M.E.
Church v. Linden, 118 N.J.L. 188, 178 At. 593 (1934); Lahey v. Inspector of
Bldgs. of New Bedford, 308 Mass. 128, 31 N.E.2d 436 (1941).
so Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. Cincinnati, 60 Ohio App. 443, 21 N.E.2d
993 (1938), 38 MICH. L. REv. 431 (1940).
"1 2700 Irving Park Bldg. Corp. v. Chicago, 395 Ill. 138, 69 N.E.2d 827
(1946), 14 U. OF CHI. L. Rv. 718 (1947), 26 CHI-KENT L. Rav. 89 (1947).
82 Taber v. Benton Harbor, 280 Mich. 522, 274 N.W. 324 (1937); State
ex rel. Helsel v. Board of Comm'rs, 37 Ohio 0. 58, 79 N.E.2d 698 (1948);
afjrd, 78 N.E.2d 694, app. dism., 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.E.2d 911 (1948);
Puhr v. Kansas City, 142 Kan. 704, 51 P.2d 911 (1935); State ex rel. Helseth
v. DuBose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930).
83 Taber v. Benton Harbor, 280 Mich. 522, 274 N.W. 324 (1937). Note,
15 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rav. 449 (1938).
84 City of Cincinnati v. WVegehoft, 119 Ohio St. 136, 162 N.E. 389 (1928).
sr, Assman v. Masters, 151 Kan. 281, 98 P.2d 419 (1940); Sweet v. Campbell,
282 N.Y. 146, 25 N.E.2d 963 (1940).
s0 Olberding v. Smith, 34 0. L. Abs. 84, 34 N.E.2d 296 (1934); Szilvasy
v. Savier, 70 Ohio App. 34, 44 N.E.2d 732 (1942); Ludgate v. Somerville, 121
Ore. 643, 256 Pac. 1043, 54 A.L.R. 837 (1927) ; Vorenberg v. Bunnell, 257 Mass.
399, 153 N.E. 884, 48 A.L.R. 1431 (1926); Dolan v. Brown, 338 Ill. 412, 170
N.E. 425 (1930); Kramer v. Nelson, 189 Wis. 560, 208 N.V. 252 (1926). Van
Hecke, Zoning Ordinances and Restrictions in Deeds, 37 YAI.E L.J. 407 (1928);
Note, 48 Mica. L. Rav. 103 (1949).
87 Taylor v. Hackensack, 137 N.J.L. 139, 58 A.2d 788 (1948).
88 Rhyne, Jurisdiction over Civil Aviation, 11 LAiW & CONTEMP. PROB. 459,
485 (1946).
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zoning limits to specified heights buildings on land located at
specific distances from the airport, with increasing heights per-
mitted with increasing distances. Notwithstanding dicta to the
effect that such limitation upon land use is constitutional, 9 and
the approval of many scholars, ° the present state of the law is
not favorable to municipal airport approach zoning.91 For the
time being municipal corporations are well advised to condemn
easements for the use of air space over lands adjacent to municipal
airports. Such power is available in many states 2 and should be
specifically granted in others.93 Easement condemnation is far
preferable to the uneconomic acquisition and wastage of lands
surrounding airports, and justice to all parties is best served by
this method.
PERIPHERAL PROTECTION
Owners of fine residential properties at the edge of many
municipalities are in continual danger of industrialization and
commercialization immediately beyond the city limits. Cities have
on many occasions been granted power to eliminate from areas
outside the city limits activities and enterprises dangerous to
the community health, safety, morality or welfare and the courts
have generally sustained such powers.94  However, grants to mu-
nicipalities of power to zone beyond their limits would be both
politically inexpedient and constitutionally doubtful. 5  The
80 United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, 55 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1944);
Burnham v. Beverley Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N.E.2d 575 (1942).
90 Rhyne, Jurisdiction over Civil Aviation, 11 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 459,
485 (1946) ; Grant, Constitutionality of Zoning Law Enacted to Protect Airport
Approaches, 13 J. Aip L. & CoMm. 272 (1942); Wolf, Airport Approach Zoning
-a Present Need, 17 U OF CIN. L. REv. 327 (1948); Freeman, Zoning of Air-
port Approaches as Exercise of Police Power, 10 J. AIR L. 426 (1939); Comment,
23 TE X L. Rv. 57 (1944); Hunter, The Conflicting Interests of Airport Owner
and Nearby Property Owner, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 539 (1946); Note, 19
TENN. L. REv. 858 (1948).
91 Yara Engineering Corp. v. Newark, 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (1945);
Rice v. Newark, 132 N.J.L. 387, 40 A.2d 561 (1945); Mutual Chemistry Co. v.
Mayor & Council of Baltimore, 1939 CCH AIR LAw RE . 5208 (Mun. Ct.);
Op. Arr'y GEN. MICH., June 24, 1937.
02 Hunter & Ulman, Airport Legal Developments of Interest to Municipali.
ties, 13 J. Am L. 116, 137 (1942).
93 Comment, 23 Trax. L. REv. 57 (1944).
94 Town of Gower v. Agee, 128 Mo. App. 427, 107 S.W. 999 (1908); Boyd
v. City Council of Montgomery, 117 Ala. 677, 23 So. 663 (1898); Chicago
Packing & Provision Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221, 30 Am. Rep. 545 (1878);
Dunham v. New Britian, 55 Conn. 378, 11 At. 354 (1887).
95 Brown v. Cle Elum, 255 Pac, 961, 261 Pac. 112 (Wash. 1927); Anderson,
The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities, 10 MINN. L. REv. 475 (1926).
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interests of most municipalities can be protected rather satisfac-
torily by full participation in county and township zoning which
can now be accepted as valid;96 by cooperation with their fringe
communities; and by joint planning, through regional authorities,
with their neighbors for park and recreational facilities near
municipal borders.
ADMINISTRATION OF ZONING ORDINANCES
Statutes authorizing zoning must be closely followed.9 7 Failure
to give the generally required notice of hearing will almost uni-
versally annul the zoning.98 Noncompliance with statutory re-
quirements is customarily not even excused in the case of interim,
emergency, or "stop-gap" ordinances designed to freeze the
status quo pending drafting and passage of a zoning ordinance
in final form.99 Occasional cases uphold, without strict conformity
to statutory mandates, temporary zoning ordinances designed to
protect property values until a comprehensive zoning ordinance
96 Vandenburgh County v. Sanders, 218 Ind. 43, 30 N.E.2d 713 (1940);
Acker v. Baldwin, 16 Cal.2d 795, 18 Cal.2d 341, 108 P.2d 899, 115 P.2d 455
(1941); County Comm'rs of Anne Arundel County v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 46
A.2d 684 (1946); Frederick v. Board of Supervisors of Jackson County, 197
Miss. 561, 20 S.2d 92 (1945); Hitchman v. Oakland Tp., 45 N.W.2d (Mich.
1951); Wertheimer, Constitutionality of Rural Zoning, 26 CALIF. L. REv. 175
(1938); Note, 131 A.R.L. 1055 (1941).
97 Strain v. Mims, 123 Conn. 275, 193 At. 754 (1937) (invalid because
no unanimous vote of council as required by statute); Williams v. Village of
Deer Park, 70 N.E.2d 102 (Ohio, 1946) (invalid because prior approval of city
plan commission not secured); Grantwood Lumber Co. v. Schweitzer, 7 N.J.
Misc. 1016, 147 Atl. 741 (1929) (invalid because not read in final form prior
to passage). Note however, Moore v. Pratt, 148 Kan. 53, 79 P.2d 871, 874
(1938): "Since the ordinance was duly passed and published, there is a strong
presumption of law that precedent legal requirements were conformed to."
98 State ex rel. Fairmont Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N.E.2d
777, 136 A.L.R. 840 (1941); Sackett Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Levine, 268
App. Div. 809, 48 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1944); Moon v. Smith, 138 Fla. 410, 189 So.
835 (1939); Ford v. Hutchinson, 140 Kan. 307, 37 P.2d 39 (1934); State ex rel.
Kramer v. Schwartz, 336 Mo. 932, 82 S.W.2d 63 (1935) ; State ex rel. Lightman
v. Nashville, 166 Tenn. 191, 60 S.W.2d 161 (1933); Krajenke Buick Sales v.
Kopkowski, 322 Mich. 250, 33 N.V.2d 781 (1948); City of Benton v. Phillips,
191 Ark. 961, 88 S.W.2d 828 (1936); Hurst v. Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277
Pac. 308 (1929); Fierst v. Wm. Penn Memorial Corp., 311 Pa. 263, 166 Atl.
761 (1933); Whittemore v. Falmouth, 299 Mass. 64, 12 N.E.2d 187 (1937);
Note, 117 A.L.R. 1117 (1938).
99 Darlington v. Board of Councilmen of Frankfort, 282 Ky. 778, 140 S.W.2d
392 (1940); Williams v. Deer Park, 70 N.E.2d 102 (Ohio C.P. 1946); State
ex rel. Kramer v. Schwartz, 336 Mo. 932, 82 S.W.2d 63 (1935); State ex rel.
Lightman v. Nashville, 166 Tenn. 191, 60 S.W.2d 161 (1933); Kline v. Harrisburg,
362 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949)); Note, 136 A.L.R. 844 (1942).
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can be worked out. 00 Amendment of state statutes to more
readily permit preliminary zoning is desirable.
Adjoining property owners suffering special damage through
diminution in value of their properties generally can enjoin
violations of a zoning ordinance.1 0' Estoppel will occasionally
prevent such relief.'o 2 And municipalities can also secure in-
junctive relief against zoning ordinance violations. 03 Although
there are a few questionable cases to the effect that a municipal
corporation will be estopped to enforce a zoning ordinance
against a particular party by its actions, 0 4 the courts are over-
whelmingly agreed that a municipality may enforce a zoning
ordinance against one individual notwithstanding evidence that
others are violating the ordinance. 05
Statutes usually prescribe the nature of the appeal from
zoning ordinances and municipal action thereunder, and "any
taxpayer or any other person having an interest in property
affected" generally has "a right to bring suit . . . to test the
reasonableness of the ordinance or any specific provision thereof
which affects his particular property in the use he desires to
make of it . . ."106 Where a form of statutory relief is provided
it must be followed at least where the attack is directed solely
at the validity of administrative action. 0 7  Where the attack is
100 Downham v. Alexandria, 58 F.2d 784 (D.C. Va. 1932); Lima v. Wood-
ruff, 107 Cal. App. 285, 290 Pac. 480 (1930); Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742, 7
S.W.2d 219 (1928); McCurley v. El Reno, 138 Okla. 92, 280 Pac. 467 (1929).
10 Welton v. 40 E. Oak St. Bldg. Corp., 70 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 590 (1934); Fitzgerald v. Merard Holding Co., 106 Conn.
475, 138 Ad. 483, 37 YALE LJ. 387 (1927); Holzbauer v. Ritter, 184 Wis. 35,
198 N.W. 852 (1924); Momeier v. McAlister, 203 S.C. 353, 27 S.E.2d 504 (1943);
Rice v. Van Vranken, 225 App. Div. 179, 232 N.Y. Supp. 506 (1929), aff'd
175 N.E. 304 (1930); Note, 129 A.L.R. 885 (1940).
.102 Fifth Church of Christ v. W.F. Pigg & Son, 109 Colo. 103, 122 P.2d
887 (1942); Chudnov v. Voard of Appeals, 113 Conn. 49, 154 At. 161 (1931);
Kelley v. Levitt & Sons, 262 App. Div. 92, 28 N.Y.S.2d 175 (1941).
103 Leigh v. Wichita, 148 Kan. 607, 83 P.2d 644 (1938); Lincoln v. Foss,
119 Neb. 666, 230 N.W. 592 (1930); Note, 129 A.L.R. 885 (1940).
104 Freeman v. Hague, 106 NJ.L. 137, 147 At. 553 (1929); Note, 119
A.L.R. 1509 (1939).
105 People ex rel. Santora v. Kreuter, 253 App. Div. 898, 1 N.Y.S.2d 879
(1938); Valicenti's Appeal, 298 Pa. 276, 148 Atl. 308 (1929); Inzerilli v. Pitney,
30 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1941); Taylor v. Hackensack, 137 N.J.L. 139, 58 A.2d 788 (1949);
Note, 119 A.L.R. 1509 (1939).
106 West v. Wichita, 118 Kan. 265, 268, 234 Pac. 978 (1925). Cf. Bazinsky
v. Kesbek, 259 App. Div. 467, 19 N.Y.S.2d 716 (1940).
107 People v. Calvar Corp., 286 N.Y. 419, 36 N.E.2d 644, 136 A.L.R. 1376
(1941) ; Taylor v. Haverford Tp., 299 Pa. 402, 149 At. 639 (1930) ; Metcalf v. Los
Angeles, 24 Cal.2d 267, 148 P.2d 645 (1944). Cf. Fidelity Trust v. Downing,
224 Ind. 457, 68 N.E.2d 789 (1946), 22 IND. L.J. 185 (1947) (permitting
14
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upon the entire ordinance generally there is no need to exhaust
administrative remedies10s Since the attacks upon zoning ordi-
nances are usually by injunction or mandamus to compel the
issuance of a permit courts customarily permit broad de novo
review of the ordinance as applied.10 9
Most zoning ordinances specifically authorize exceptions to
prohibited uses."l0 Furthermore, variances to the legislative plan
can be made by zoning boards of appeal, adjustment, or review
which are customarily provided for in the zoning statutes or
ordinances."' These boards must be given adequate standards
by the legislative body to direct them in authorizing variations
or the zoning legislation will likely be invalidated as an uncon-
stitutional delegation of legislative powers. 2 It is enough direc-
tion, according to the weight of authority, that boards of adjust-
ment are permitted to grant variances in the event of "practical
difficulty or unnecessary hardship." 113
direct judicial appeal by one unable under the statute to have recourse to the
board of appeals).
10 Curtiss-WNright Corp. v. Garden City, 85 Misc. 508, 57 N.Y.S.2d 377
(1945); Long v. Highland Park, 45 N.V.2d 10 (Mich. 1950); Central Trust Co.
v. Cincinnati, 62 Ohio App. 139, 23 N.E.2d 450 (1939); Dowsey v. Kensington,
257 N.Y. 221, 117 N.E. 427, 86 A.L.R. 642 (1931).
1U9 Tighe v. Osborne, 149 Md. 349, 131 Atl. 801 (1925); Senefsky v.
Huntington Woods, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W.2d 387, 149 A.L.R. 1433 (1943);
Hitchman v. Oakland Tp., 45 N.V.2d 306 (Mich. 1951).
"I" Exceptions should not be confused with variances although they fre-
quently are. The former are deviations from the rule specifically authorized
in the zoning ordinance. Thus, to be entitled to an exception, there is no need
to prove hardship.
M11 Baker, The Zoning Board of Appeal, 10 MINN. L. REv. 277 (1926); Note,
31 MICH. L. REv. 106 (1932).
112 Texas Consol. Theaters v. Pittico, 204 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947), 1 BAYLOR L. REv. 228 (1948); Jack Lewis, Inc. v. Baltimore, 164 Md.
146, 164 Atl. 220 (1933); Flynn v. Zoning Board of Review, 73 A.2d 808 (RI.
1950); Continental Oil Co. v. Wichita Falls, 42 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928); Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 Atl. 50, 38 A.L.R. 1455 (1925);
Tighe v. Osborne, 149 Md. 349, 131 At. 801 (1925); Sugar v. North Baltimore
Meth. Prot. Church, 164 Md. 487, 165 At. 703 (1933). Note, 29 B.U.L.REv.
406 (1949). Note, 42 A.L.R. 834 (1926).
13 Spencer-Sturla Co~v. Memphis, 155 Tenn. 70,290 S.W. 608 (1927) ;'Sundeen
v. Rogers, 83 N.H. 253, 141 AtI. 142 (1928); Re Dawson, 136 Okla. 113, 277
Pac. 226 (1928); Lincoln v. Foss, 119 Neb. 666, 230 N.W. 592 (1930); People
ex rel. Sheldon v. Board of Appeals, 234 N.Y. 484, 138 N.E. 416 (1923); L. & M.
Inv. Co. v. Cutler, 125 Ohio St. 12, 180 N.E. 379, 86 A.L.R. 707 (1932); Free-
man v. Board of Adjustment, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P.2d 534 (1934); McCord v. Ed
Bond & Condon Co., 175 Ga. 667, 165 S.E. 590, 86 A.L.R. 703 (1932). Contra:
Welton v. Hamilton, 344 Ill. 82, 176 N.E. 333 (1931), criticized in Note, 26
ILL. L. REv. 575 (1931). Note, 97 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 68 (1948); Note, 168
A.L.R. 13, 25 (1947).
15
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Boards of review cannot ordinarily change the boundaries
of zones. 114 And courts frown on attempts by zoning boards of
appeal or review to grant wholesale variances as usurpation of
the legislative responsibility.115 The New York Court of Appeals
has said: "Before the Board of Appeals may exercise its discretion
and grant a variance upon the ground of unnecessary hardship,
the record must show (1) that the land in question cannot yield
a reasonable return if used only for the purpose allowed in that
zone; (2) that the plight of the owner is due to unique circum-
stances and not to general conditions in the neighborhood which
may reflect the unreasonableness of the zoning ordinance itself;
(3) that the use to be authorized by the variance will not alter
the essential character of the locality."" 0 Other courts have de-
manded proof that the variance will (1) be in harmony with
the general plan and spirit of the zoning ordinance, 1 7 and (2) not
unfairly diminish the property values of others." 8
The cases indicate that the courts have been influenced in
sustaining variances or in reversing boards of appeal that refused
variances by the following factors, none of which, however, can
be taken as an assurance of a right to a variation: (1) the existence
of several other similar nonconforming uses in the district; 11"9
(2) changed conditions from the time of passage of the zoning
ordinance; -2 0  (3) financial loss to the owner of the property; 121
114 Bray v. Beyer, 292 Ky. 162, 166 S.W.2d 290 (1942). Note, 168 A.L.R.
13, 51 (1947). But see Bradley v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 255 Mass.
160, 150 N.E. 892 (1926) (permitting board to change boundaries).
15 Potts v. Board of Adjustment, 133 N.J.L. 230, 43 A.2d 850 (1945);
County Commissioners v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 46 A.2d 684 (1946).
116 Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851, 853 (1939).
:LL Evanston Best & Co. v. Goodman, 369 Ill. 207, 16 N.E.2d 131 (1938);
Potts v. Board of Adjustment, 133 NJ.L. 230, 43 A.2d 850 (1945); Note, 168
A.L.R. 13, 37 (1947). Courts are not agreed on whether appeal boards can
authorize things prohibited in the zoning ordinance. Harrington v. Board of
Adjustment, 124 S.V.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Note, 168 A.L.R. 13,
48 (1947).
"is Barrett v. Bedell, 255 App. Div. 874, 7 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1938); People
ex rel. Werner v. Walsh, 212 App. Div. 635, 208 N.Y. Supp. 454 (1925) ; Note 168
A.L.R. 13, 89 (1947).
"19 Hammond v. Board of Appeals, 257 Mass. 446, 154 N.E. 82 (1926);
Bartram v. Zoning Comm'n, 136 Conn. 89, 68 A.2d 308 (1949); Note, 168
A.L.R. 18, 41 (1947).
120 Norcross v. Board of Appeals, 255 Mass. 177, 150 N.E. 887 (1925);
Note, 38 MicH. L. REv. 434 (1940) .
121. First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 126
Conn. 228, 10 A.2d 691 (1940); Holy Sepulchre Cemetery v. Board of Appeals,
271 App. Div. 33, 60 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1946); Notes 117 A.L.R. 1127, 1128 (1938),
168 A.L.R. 19, 32 (1947).
16
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(4) housing shortages and war emergencies; 2 2 and (5) general
public interest. 123  In granting a variance, a board of zoning
appeals may impose reasonable conditions.124
Any interested party, such as an adjoining property owner,' 2
may protest to the courts the grant of a variance by a board of
appeals, adjustment or review. Generally the scope of review is
very limited, 126 as typified by the statement of the Pennsylvania
court: "The ruling of the board should not be overruled in the
absence of a manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion."'127 The
decisions indicate, quite clearly that the courts will scrutinize
with much more care the grant of a variance by a board 12 than
the denial of such a variance.
129
122 Spadafora v. Ferguson, 182 Misc. 161, 48 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1944), affd,
50 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1945); People ex rel. Saypol v. Griffin, 182 Misc. 454, 44
N.Y.S.2d 68 (1943); City of San Diego v. Van Winkle, 69 Cal.A.2d 237, 158
P.2d 774 (1945); Griffith v. Los Angeles, 78 Cal.A.2d 796, 178 P.2d 793 (1947).
But see Potts v. Board of Adjustment, 133 N.J.L. 230, 43 A.2d 850 (1945),
and County Comm'rs v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 46 A.2d 684 (1946).
123 Vessell v. Board of Standards, 243 N.Y. Supp. 418 (1928); Buck-
master v. Zoning Board of Review, 69 R.I. 396, 33 A.2d 199 (1943); Note, 168
A.L.R. 13, 36 (1947).
124 Kelley v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 126 Conn. 648, 13 A.2d 675 (1940);
Sundlun v. Board of Review, 50 R.I. 108, 145 AtI. 451 (1929); Seligman v.
Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 277 Ky. 551, 126 S.W.2d 419 (1938);
Soho Park & Land Co. v. Board of Adjustment, 6 N.J. Misc. 686, 142 Atl. 548
(1928); Appeal of Consolidated Cleaning Shops, 103 Pa. Super. 66, 157 At.
811 (1931).
125 Thayer v. Board of Appeals, 114 Conn. 15, 157 At. 273 (1931);
Note, 129 A.L.R. 885 (1940). Compare Circle Lounge & Grille v. Board of Appeals,
324 Mass. 427, 86 N.E.2d 920 (1949) (denying right to appeal grant of variance
when appellant owned nearby property but in a different zone).
126 Application of Elkins Park Improvement Ass'n, 361 Pa. 322, 64 A.2d
783 (1949); People ex rel. Sheldon v. Board of Appeals, 235 N.Y. 484, 138
N.E. 416 (1923). For statements that courts will not review board findings
of fact, see, Beardsley v. Church, 261 Mich. 458, 246 N.W. 180 (1933), and
Rubin v. Board, 16 Cal.2d 119, 104 P.2d 1041 (1940).
127 Fleming v. Prospect Park Board of Adjustment, 318 Pa. 582, 178 At.
813, 814 (1935).
128 Thayer v. Board of Appeals, 114 Conn. 15, 157 Aft. 273 (1931), 31
MIcti. L. REV. 106 (1932); Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 221 N.W. 354
(1928); Nicolai v. Board of Adjustment, 55 Ariz. 283, 101 P.2d 199 (1940);
Keeling v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 117 Ind. App. 314, 69 N.E.2d 613 (1946).
129 Appeal of Barr, 294 Pa. 246, 144 Ati. 81 (1928); Colati v. Jirout, 186
Md. 652, 47 A.2d 613 (1946). "We have clearly held that the decision of a
zoning board of review upon matters within its discretion will not be set
aside unless it clearly appears that the board acted arbitrarily or abused its
discretion." Kent v. Zoning Board of Review, 63 A.2d 731 (R.I. 1949). But
for cases where denials were judically reversed see: Beardsley v. Church, 261
Mich. 458, 246 N.W. 180 (1933); In re Crawford's Appeal, 358 Pa. 636, 57
A.2d 862 (1948); Sundlun v. Zoning Board of Review, 50 R.I. 108, 145 At. 451
(1929); E. Providence Mills v. Zoning Board of Review, 51 R.I. 428, 155 Ad.
531 (1931); Jersey Triangle Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 127 N.J.L. 194, 21
A.2d 845 (1941). Note, 62 HARv. L. RIv. 327 (1948).
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Once a board of appeal or adjustment has granted a license
for a variance and the property owner has made substantial
progress toward the accomplishment of the variance, the munici-
pality will not generally be able to revoke the permit or forbid
the use authorized thereby.130  There is further evidence that
variance permit revocations will be judicially voided when the
court cannot detect a substantial relation to the community
health, safety, morals or general welfare.1 31  Both the grant and
revocation of variance permits are quasi-judicial tasks and due
process of law is generally interpreted to require that the hearing
be preceded by notice and conducted with fairness and according
to rules of law. 32
NONZONING LAND USE REGULATION
Municipal corporations of course possess the power to abate
nuisances per se. 1 3 3 So, edifices constituting fire hazards can be
destroyed or closed, 34 and noisome enterprises,' 3 as well as
those emitting noxious odors 3  or undue amounts of smoke' 37
can be suppressed.
Furthermore, there are many enterprises and activities not
nuisances per se that become extremely objectionable in certain
districts of a crowded municipality. The courts have wisely
permitted municipal legislation to increase the concept of nui-
sances.13  Cities have accordingly been sustained in eliminating
from the entire community land uses highly dangerous to public
130 Sandenburgh v. Michigamme Oil Co., 249 Mich. 372, 228 N.W. 707
(1930).
131 Note, 38 GEo. L.J. 494 (1950).
1V2 Wedill v. Board of Appeals, 18 U.S.L. WEEK 2087 (Conn. Sup. Ct.
Err. 1949); McGarry v. Walsh, 213 App. Div. 289, 210 N.Y. Supp. 286 (1925);
Berg v. Zoning Board of Review, 64 R.I. 290, 12 A.2d 225 (1940); Richard v.
Woonsocket Board of Review, 47 R.I. 102, 129 At. 736 (1925).
133 State v. Haines, 30 Me. 65 (1849); City of St. Louis v. Galt, 179 Mo.
8, 77 S.W. 876, 63 L.R.A. 778 (1903).
134 Zibilich v. Rouseo, 166 La. 547, 117 So. 586 (1928); Wm .Fox Amuse-
ment Co. v. McClellan, 62 Misc. 100, 114 N.Y. Supp. 594 (1909). Notes,
26 A.L.R. 1219 (1923); 56 A.L.R. 878 (1928); 140 A.L.R. 1048 (1942).
'35 Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 567 (1934).
136 Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); Wood v. Chickasha,
125 Okla, 212, 257 Pac. 286 (1927); St. Bernard Poultry Farm v. Aurora, 98
Colo. 158, 54 P.2 684 (1936). Note, 141 A.L.R. 285 (1942).
137 City of Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Milling Co., 199 N.Y. 207, 92
N.E. 641, 32 L.R.A. (N.s.) 554 (1910); Ballentine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164
S.W.2d 378 (1942).
138 Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1918); Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930).
Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 COL L. REv. 457 (1941).
18
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health and safety, such as gas storage depots. 39 Although a
large metropolis did not succeed in completely banning gas
stations,140 a smaller residential community has been sustained
in denying within it all industrial establishments,14 and this
decision should be followed. There are many additional decisions
concerned with portions of municipalities and sustaining the ban
therefrom as nuisances noisome activities, 42 industries emitting
noxious odors, 43 unaesthetic edifices, 44 businesses congesting the
traffic of the neighborhood, 45  and enterprises disturbing the
peace'146 or morals' 47 of the residents.
As protection against fire cities can of course impose many
regulations upon building construction and use. 4 Sanitation and
health justify further regulations of land use. 49  Billboards can
-9 Larkin v. Schwab, 242 N.Y. 330, 151 N.E. 637 (1926); Church v.
Bouyea, 246 App. Div. 109, 285 N.Y. Supp. 7 (1936); Miami Beach v. Texas
Co., 141 Fla. 616, 194 So. 368 (1940); Greenwich Gas Co. v. Tuthill, 113 Conn.
684, 155 At. 850 (1931). Note, 128 A.L.R. 364 (1940). Note also People v.
Hanrahan, 75 Mich. 611, 42 N.W. 1124, 4 L.R.A. 751 (1889), and Fisher v.
Paragould, 127 Ark. 268, 192 S.V. 219 (1917) (disorderly houses).
140 Gulf Oil v. Board of Comm'rs, 128 N.J.L. 376, 26 A.2d 246 (1942).
141 Duffcon Concrete Products v. Borough of Cresskill, I N.J. 509, 64 A.2d
347 (1949). Accord: Village of Old Westbury v. Foster, 83 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1948).
But cf. Dowsey v. Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931) (invalidating
prohibition on business structures throughout village).
142 Scruggs v. Wheeler, 4 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927, err. ref.).
Compare City of Miami Beach v. Daoud, 6 S.2d 847, 7 S.2d 585 (Fla. 1942).
Lloyd, Noise as a Nuisance, 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 567 (1934). Notes, 20
A.L.R. 1482 (1922), 40 A.L.R. 341 (1926), 55 A.L.R. 372 (1928), 84 A.L.R.
1147 (1933).
143 Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); People v. Department
of Health, 235 App. Div. 819, 256 N.Y. Supp. 856 (1932).
144 Lombardo v. Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475 (1934); Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Wright, 124 Okla. 55, 254 Pac. 41 (1926); Kramer v.
Mayor & Council of Baltimore, 166 Md. 324, 171 At. 70 (1934). Notes, 124
A.L.R. 383 (1940), 96 A.L.R. 1337 (1935).
145 Momeier v. McAlister, 203 S.C. 353, 27 S.E.2d 504 (1943).
146 Jones v. Los Angeles, 277 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930); State ex rel.
Skillman v. Miami, 101 Fla. 585, 134 So. 541 (1931); State ex rel. Dallas In-
vestment Co. v. Peace, 139 Fla. 394, 190 So. 607 (1939).
147 Johnson v. Bessemer, 143 Mich. 313, 106 N.W. 852 (1906); Alexander
v. Graves, 178 Miss. 583, 173 So. 417 (1937). Note, 139 A.L.R. 840 (1942).
148 City of Chicago v. Washingtonian Home of Chicago, 289 II. 206, 124
N.E. 416, 6 A.L.R. 1584 (1919); Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S.
80 (1946); Betty v. Sidney, 79 Mont. 314, 257 Pac. 1007, 56 A.L.R. 872 (1927);
Capital Homes v. Dandrow, 15 N.J. Misc. 634, 193 At. 918 (1937). Note,
26 A.L.R. 1219 (1923); 140 A.L.R. 1048 (1942).
149 Daniels v. Portland, 124 Ore. 677, 265 Pac. 790, 59 A.L.R. 512 (1928);
Lower Merion Tp. v. Gallup, 158 Pa. Super. 752, 46 A.2d 35, app. dism.
329 U.S. 669 (1946); Harmon v. M.H. Sherman Co., 29 GalA.2d 580, 85
P.2d 205 (1939); Village of Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N.Y. 268, 25 N.E.
480, 10 L.RA. 178 (1890).
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be excluded from certain districts and limited elsewhere.150 To
insure adequate light and air and to reduce fire hazards
municipalities may, without regard for zones or districts, adopt
numerous property regulations,1' 1 including set-back ordinances "
and minimum yard ordinances.15 3
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT THROUGH MUNICIPAL LAND
OWNERSHIP AND SALE
The power of municipal' corporations to condemn land for
the clearance of slums is by now generally accepted,1 4 as is the
power to construct low-cost housing projects.15   Where such
power is still wanting or where financial limitations prevent
municipal improvements, municipalities can be instrumental in
creating separate public housing authorities,"0 and in encouraging
by condemnation of land and tax exemption private housing pro-
jects.57 that can do much to resettle urban residents and improve
the appearance of the community.
There is no doubt of the power of municipalities to condemn
land for boulevards, 58 parks,'" and golf courses. 0 0 Municipal
150 General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N.E. 309
(1930); St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919); Liggett's
Petition, 291 Pa. 109, 139 At. 619 (1927); Murphy v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292,
40 A.2d 177 (1944). Note Mid-state Adv. Corp. v. Bond, 274 N.Y. 82, 8
N.E.2d 286 (1937) (invalidating prohibition on advertising everywhere in town).
151 Notes, 9 A.L.R. 1040 (1920), 59 A.L.R. 518 (1929).
152 Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Kerr's Appeal, 294 Pa. 246, 144
At. 81 (1928). Note, 30 MIcH. L. REv. 803 (1932). Notes, 28 A.L.R. 314
(1924), 44 A.L.R. 1377 (1926), A.L.R. 1222 (1928).
'L3 Doherty v. Town Council of South Kingston, 61 R.I. 248, 200 At!.
964 (1938); Appeal of Blackstone, 38 Del. 230, 190 At. 597 (1937).
'54 Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288,
23 N.E.2d 665 (1939); Willmon v. Powell, 91, Cal. App. 1, 266 Pac. 1029 (1928).
'55 New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d
153 (1936); Simon v. O'Toole, 108 N.J.L. 32, 155 Atl. 449 (1931); Re Brewster
St. Housing Site, 291 Mich. 313, 289 N.W. 493 (1939). McDougal and Mueller,
Public Purpose in Public Housing; an Anachronism Reburied, 52 YALE L.J.
42 (1942); Comment, 54 YALE L.J. 116 (1944); Note, 50 YALE L.J. 525 (1941);
Note, 9 U. oF Cm. L. Rzv. 477 (1942); Notes, 105 A.L.R. 911 (1936), 130
A.L.R. 1069 (1941).
356Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 357 P. 329,
54 A.2d 277 (1947); Dornan v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 331 Pa.
209, 200 At. 834 (1938).
157 Zurn v. Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 59 N.E.2d 18 (1945); Murray v. LaGuardia,
291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943).
158 City of Kirksville v. Hines, 285 Mo. 233, 225 S.W. 950 (1920); Town
of Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 (1933).
'59 Memphis v. Hastings, 113 Tenn. 142, 86 S.W. 609, 69 L.R.A. 750 (1904);
Dow Arneson Co. v. St. Paul, 177 Minn. 164, 225 N.W. 92 (1929). Cf. City
of Birmingham v. Brown, 241 Ala. 203, 2 S.2d 305 (1941).
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corporations should be able to condemn or purchase objectionable
nonconforming 6" uses which degrade a district but are beyond
the general reach of zoning ordinances. There is the further possi-
bility that municipalities may be able to condemn larger areas to
create restricted residential districts.1 62 A strong tool in the guided
development of cities is contained in the municipal sale of land sub-
ject to restrictive covenants adequate to protect the neighborhood.
This has been sustained on rare occasions, 63 but the majority of
courts are as yet unreceptive to extensive real estate purchase and
sale by municipal corporations. 6 4 The specter of "excess condemna-
improvements beyond the strict requirements of "public use."'16 5
SUBDMSION CONTROL
If municipal planning is adequate the interest of the com-
munity in new subdivisions can generally be safeguarded ade-
quately by refusal to accept subdivisions or record plats thereof
until the developer has satisfactorily laid out streets and boule-
yards to conform to municipal planning and dedicated to the
municipality sufficient sites for schools and recreational facilities.
Such power is customarily available to municipal corporations. 68
160 Capen v. Portland, 112 Ore. 14, 228 Pac. 105, 35 A.L.R. 589 (1924);
City of Bradentown v. State, 88 Fla. 381, 102 So. 556, 36 A.L.R. 1297 (1924).
161 Bartholomew, Non-Conforming Uses Destroy the Neighborhood, 16 J.
LAN)) & P. U. EcON. 96 (1939); Comment, 52 YALE L.J. 634 (1943); Note,
46 CoL. L. REv. 108 (1946); Note, 28 TEx. L. Rav. 125 (1949). Municipalities
can use the power of eminent domain to establish set-back lines beyond which no
building is permitted. Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404, 28
A.L.R. 295 (1923).
162 State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. &- Imp. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn.
1, 176 N.W. 159, 8 A.L.R. 585 (1920); State ex rel. Madsen v. Houghton,
182 Minn. 77, 233 N.W. 831 (1930). Note MicH. STATS. ANN. § 5.2938. Com-
ment, 39 YALE LJ. 735 (1930).
163 First Municipality of New Orleans v. McDonough, 2 Rob. 244 (La.
1842).
164 Penn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 88 At. 904,
49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1062 (1913).
165 Steiner, Excess Condemnation, 3 Mo. L. Rv. 1 (1938); Hart, Excess
Condemnation-A Solution of Some Problems of Urban Life, 11 MARQ. L.
Rav. 222 (1927); Nicholas, The Use of Excess Condemnation in Connection
with Housing, 4 Ams. MuN. L. Rv. 14 (1938); Nicholas, The Meaning of Public
Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. Rav. 615 (1940); Note, 46
COL. L. REv. 108; Note, 4 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 474 (1930).
166 Village of Lynbrook v. Cadoo, 252 N.Y. 308, 169 N.E. 394 (1929);
Ridgefield Land Co. v. Detroit, 241 ,Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928); Ayres v.
Common Council of Los Angeles, 34 Ca.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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